

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
USSEL MBFR VIENNA 10

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 0855

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG, PARM
SUBJECT: CSCE: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET
REPS

SUMMARY: DURING CONVERSATIONS FEB 5 AND 6 WITH US
DELOFF ON CBM ISSUES, SOVIET REPS ASKED WHETHER BROADER,
"POLITICAL" FORMULATION OF MANEUVERS MEASURE COULD BE
ACCEPTABLY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CURRENT IMPASSE ON
SPECIFIC PARAMETERS AND VARYING NEEDS OF DIFFERENT CSCE
PARTICIPANTS FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. SOVITES ALSO
PROPOSED LANGUAGE TO EFFECT THAT PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF
MOVEMENTS COULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF
EXPERIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF MANEUVERS
AND OBSERVERS MEASURES, WITHOUT PREJUDGING FOLLOW-UP
QUESTION. US AND SOVIET REPS DISCUSSED
TACTICS FOR CURRENT SUBCOMMITTEE WORK ON DRAFT TEXT
CONCERNING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN EUROPE. ACTION
REQUESTED: GUIDANCE ON SOVIET SUGGESTION RE PRIOR

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NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS.

1. AT REQUEST OF SOVIET AMB. MENDELEVITCH, US DELOFF MET WITH SOVIET MILITARY SECURITY REPS MICHAILOV, BASKAKOV, AND MEDVEDEV ON FEB 5-6 FOR DETAILED REVIEW OF CBM ISSUES CURRENTLY BEING DEALT WITH IN CSCE SUB-COMMITTEE. US REP AGAIN LAID OUT BASIS FOR IMPORTANCE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ATTACH TO SUBSTANTIAL CBM'S, IN PARTICULAR CLEAR AND MEANINGFUL GUIDELINES FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS. ENSUING DISCUSSION COVERED MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS MEASURES AND TACTICS FOR TEXT ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN EUROPE (HELSINKI PARA 22 AND 24), AS FOLLOWS:

2. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS: WHILE AGREEING WITH US ON POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO CONFIDENCE OF PROPOSED MEASURE, SOVIETS SHOWED CONCERN THAT STATES NOTIFIED ABOUT A MANEUVER MIGHT USE A LONG ADVANCE WARNING PERIOD TO MOUNT COUNTERMEASURES. AS AN EXAMPLE, MICHAILOV CITED AN INCIDENT WHEN THE WARSAW PACT HAD SCHEDULED AN EXERCISE NEAR THE WEST AND NATO HAD THEN ANNOUNCED AN EXERCISE IN AN ADJOINING AREA. IN ORDER TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION THE PACT HAD MOVED ITS EXERCISE AREA. US REP SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF SUCH AN INCIDENT, BUT POINTED OUT THAT COUNTERMEASURES COULD ALWAYS BE TAKEN WITH OR WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION, BUT THAT EARLY AND AMPLE NOTIFICATION SHOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF MIS-INTERPRETATION AND THE NEED FOR COUNTERMEASURES.

3. MICHAILOV THEN ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE "TO TRY OUT JUST AN IDEA", TO LOOK AT THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE IN A MORE POLITICAL WAY, AND TO FORMULATE IT MORE ALONG THE LINES OF THE AGREED MEASURE ON EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS. THE USSR WOULD NATURALLY BE ONE OF THE NOTIFYING COUNTRIES MUCH MORE OFTEN THAN A NOTIFIED COUNTRY, BUT THE TYPE OF NOTIFICATION MIGHT DIFFER FOR DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF MANEUVERS, FOR SMALLER VS LARGER COUNTRIES, NEIGHBORS VS DISTANT ONES, ETC. WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID CONCRETE AND SPECIFIC TERMS, AND LET EACH STATE JUDGE FOR ITSELF WHAT IT SHOULD NOTIFY TO OTHER, OR BE NOTIFIED ABOUT;

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THE STATES TO BE NOTIFIED COULD LET IT BE KNOWN WHAT LEVEL AND TYPE OF MANEUVERS WOULD BE OF CONCERN TO THEM. OBVIOUSLY LUXEMBOURG AND LIECHTENSTEIN WOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT SMALL MANEUVERS, BUT OTHERS WOULD ONLY WORRY ABOUT LARGER ONES.

4. US REP QUESTIONED SOVIETS ABOUT EXTENT TO WHICH MICHAILOV'S "IDEA" WOULD INVOLVE A MEANINGFUL CO-

MITMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE MANEUVERS MEASURE. BASKAKOV ARGUED THAT A GENERAL POLITICAL COMMITMENT SIGNED BY CHIEFS OF STATES WOULD BE A VERY POWERFUL ONE. EVEN IF THE DETAILS WERE NOT SPELLED OUT, A NATION WHICH FAILED TO LIVE UP TO THE SPIRIT OF AN UNDERTAKING ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION WOULD BE IN AN "IMPOSSIBLE" POSITION. MICHAILOV ADDED THAT AS THE PRACTICE DEVELOPED, PRIOR NOTIFICATION MIGHT END UP BEING GIVEN IN EVEN GREATER DETAIL THAN PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED, AT LEAST FOR SOME STATES.

5. US REP AGREED TO GIVE FURTHER REFLECTION TO SOVIET IDEA, BUT EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE SATISFACTORY FOR WESTERN PARLIAMENTS AND PRESS. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE LOOKING FOR MORE SPECIFIC GUIDELINES, WITHOUT WHICH THEY COULD NOT BE ASSURED THAT THEY WOULD GET ADEQUATE PRIOR NOTIFICATION WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE FACT. US REP PRESSED SOVIETS TO REVIEW CURRENT MANEUVERS TEXT, ON BASIS OF WHICH ALLIED COUNTRIES HAVE MADE CLEAR THEY ARE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE.

6. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS: SOVIETS BROUGHT UP THIS TOPIC ON FEB 6. MEETING. BASKAKOV SAID THE SOVIETS WERE READY TO HAVE FINAL CSCE RESOLUTIONS SAY NOTHING AT ALL ON THE SUBJECT OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS, NOT EVEN THAT THE HELSINKI RECOMMENDATION HAD BEEN STUDIED. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, THEY COULD ACCEPT THE FIRST SENTENCE THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED (TO THE EFFECT THAT THE QUESTION HAS BEEN STUDIED), TOGETHER WITH A FINDING BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT THERE SHOULD BE "FURTHER STUDY" OF THE MOVEMENTS ISSUE, WITHOUT REQUIRING ANY REFERENCE TO WHERE OR WHEN SUCH A STUDY WOULD TAKE PLACE. THEY COULD NOT, HOWEVER,

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ACCEPT A VAGUE BUT POSITIVE RECOGNITION OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS AS A CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN SECURITY. BASKAKOV SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS ISSUE HAD COME UP AT THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING AND HE ASKED FOR THE PRESENT US VIEW.

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ACTION SS-25

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7. US REP REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A SENSITIVE TOPIC THAT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOVIET SIDE AT VLADIVOSTOK HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE STUDY OF NOTIFYING MILITARY MOVEMENTS BE PUT OFF UNTIL A FOLLOW-UP PHASE, BUT THAT THE US HAD REPLIED THAT DEALING WITH THE MOVEMENTS ISSUE IN A FOLLOW-UP PHASE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NATO ALLIES.

8. BASKAKOV THEN ASKED IF IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE SOMEHOW TO DISPOSE OF THE HENSINKI RECOMMENDATION BY SUGGESTING THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS MIGHT DEVELOP IN LIGHT OF THE EXPERIENCE GAINED IN IMPLEMENTING THE OTHER TWO CBM'S. HE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WOULD ONLY BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS IF IT WERE ALSO CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THERE WOULD BE NO POSITIVE REFERENCE TO A MOVEMENTS MEASURE, I.E., NO EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT JUDGEMENT THAT SUCH A MEASURE WAS, IN ITSELF, DESIRABLE. BASKAKOV SUGGESTED SEVERAL FORMULATIONSS, SUCH AS "THE STUDY OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS COULD BE
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PURSUED IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERINCE WITH PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS AND EXCHANGES OF OBSERVERS" OR "IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE WITH PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS AND EXCHANGED OF OBSERVERS, THE QUESTION OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION

OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS COULD BE REOPENED (L'ON POURRAIT RETOURNER A CETTE QUESTION)".

9. US REP OBSERVED THAT THESE FORMULATIONS SEEMED TO RETAIN BRAWBACK THAT THEY IMPLIED THAT CSCE PARTICIPANTS WOULD SOMEHOW, SOMETIME HAVE TO REASSEMBLE TO DISCUSS PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS. THIS IMPLICATION, EVEN IF ONLY AN INDIRECT ONE, WOULD SIMPLY NOT ACCORD WITH THE ALLIED POSITION. BASKAKOV SAID THE SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT AND DO NOT WISH TO PREJUDGE THE QUESTION OF FOLLOW-UP IN THIS TEXT. SOVIET AND US REPS AGREED TO DISCUSS SUBJECT FURTHER ON A SUBSEQUENT OCCASION.

10. TACTICS FOR HELSINKI PARAS 22 AND 24: US AND SOVIET REPS REVIEWED EFFORTS TO FIND CONSENSUS ON INDIRECT REFERENCES IN FINAL CSCE TEXTS TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS (I.E. MBFR AND SALT). SOVIET COMPLAINED THAT US AND SOVIET INTEREST WERE BROADLY THE SAME, BUT SOVIETS IN AUTUMN 1974 SMALL GROUP DRAFTING ESSAYS (IN WHICH US DID NOT TAKE PART) HAD BORNE THE BRUNT OF FINDING OFF ATTEMPTS LARGELY BY NEUTRALS TO WRITE TEXT THAT WOULD GIVE THEM SOME RECOGNIZED INFLUENCE ON NEGOTIATIONS ELSEWHERE. US REP SUGGESTED THAT BOTH US AND USSR MIGHT IN THE END BE ABLE TO ACCEPT A TEXT IN WHICH "INTEREST" OF CSCE PARTICIPANTS IN BEING INFORMED OF FORMAL RESULTS OF OTHER NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE RECOGNIZED, BUT AGREED IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET COMPLAINT TO MAKE GENERAL STATEMENT IN SUBCOMMITTEE TO EFFECT THAT CSCE SHOULD NOT SET RULES FOR OTHER NEGOTIATIONS OR SIMPLY THAT IT WAS COMPETENT TO DO SO. (US REP MADE THIS STATEMENT IN SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEBRUARY 7).

11. COMMENT: IN ADDITION TO DRAWBACKS NOTED IN INITIAL US REACTION TO SOVIET "IDEA" FOR A BROADER, POLITICAL FORMULATION OF MANEUVERS MEASURES, SOVIET SUGGESTION HAS
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DISADVANTAGE OF IMPLYING THAT PRIOR NOTIFICATION WOULD NOT BE GIVEN MULTILATERALLY TO ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS; I.E., ONLY SMALL STATES WOULD BE NOTIFIED OF SMALL MANEUVERS, OR ONLY NEIGHBORING STATES, ETC. THIS IS IN CONFLICT WITH FIRM US AND THE WESTERN POSITION THAT NOTIFICATION MUST BE GIVEN MULTILATERALLY TO ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TESTING THE WATER FOR NEW SOLUTIONS IS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN, AND SOME EVENTUAL MARRIAGE OF THE SOVIET APPROACH WITH ELEMENTS OF THE RECENT CANADIAN IDEA (GENEVA 433 AND 674) AND/OR DUTCH SUGGESTION IN

FEB 7 NAC (USNATO 694) MAY YET BE POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, ALLIES HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE SPECIFIC CBM PARAMETERS, AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD REFRAIN FOR THE MOMENT FROM SHOWING ANY FURTHER GIVE IN OUR POSITION.

12. AS FOR SOVIET THINKING ON MOVEMENTS, FORMULATIONS SUGGESTED BY BASKAKOV ARE NO MORE THAN VARIATIONS ON EASTERN THEME IDENTIFIED IN UK'S MID-DECEMBER ANALYSIS OF ISSUE (GENEVA 7544), TO WHICH GUIDANCE IN STATE 10050 APPLIES. ON OTHER HAND, IN LIGHT OF APPARENT HESITATIONS ON PART OF SOME ALLIES ABOUT A FORMULATION ENVISAGING PURELY DISCRETIONARY NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS, DEVELOPING A TEXT ALONG LINES OF SOVIET EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH MIGHT ULTIMATELY PROVIDE BETTER BASIS FOR A BROADLY ACCEPTABLE MINIMUM MEASURE ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS, AS LONG AS TEXT CAN BE PURGED OF FOLLOW-UP IMPLICATIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE AS TO WHETHER IN SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH SOVIETS WE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE THEM TO PURSUE THIS LINE OF THINKING. DALE

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